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Summary  findings
Economic theory and case study evidence have long  security of property,  the reliability of the judiciary, and
suggested that institutional factors, such as weli-defined  their problems with bureaucratic corruption.  The authors
property and contract rights, may be crucial in  construct and test a summary indicator of the "credibility
explaining differences in economic performance across  of rules," as well as its components  in standard cross-
countries. Much of the recent discussion about  country growth and investment regressions.
"governance" has, for example, focused on the role of  The main findings:
corruption and its consequences for investment and  The overall indicator of credibility is significantly
growth. By comparison,  the empirical literature  relating  related with higher rates of investment and growth.
institutional factors with growth has been relatively  The credibility  indicator calculated for the
sca-rce  and has mainly concentrated on crude proxies  subsampie of small local companies is even more closely
such as political instability and macroeconomic volatility.  related to the growth performance.
The problem of most of these variables in that they  The subindicators "security of persons and
inadequately capture the uncertainties that are relevant  property"  and "predictability  of rule-making" are most
for entrepreneurs.  closely associated with growth.
Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder propose new measures  *  The indicators of "corruption,"  "perceived political
of institutional uncertainty based on the sujbjective  instability," and "predictability of judiciary enforcement"
evaluations of entrepreneurs.  They surveyed the private  are most closely associated with investment."
sector in a broad cross-section of countries. The survey  e  Preliminary results for an extended sample -
was designed to capture institutional factors such as the  including transition economies - indicate that
predictability of rules, entrepreneurs'  fears of policy  institutional factors may also help to explain differences
surprises and reversals, their perception of safety and  in economic performance in these countries.
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Produced by the Policy Research Disseminatiorn  CenterIntroduction
The general idea that an instable political framework lowers growth is hardly
controversial.  One would expect that a business environment characterized by "incredible" rules
such as unclear property rights, constant policy surprises and policy reversals, uncertain contract
enforcement and high corruption would translate into lower investment and growth. In such an
uncertain environment entrepreneurs are reluctant to commit resources especially in projects that
are characterized by large sunk cost. 2 This reaction of the private sector not only reduces
aggregate investment but also distorts the allocation of resources and reduces economic growth.
How the relevant uncertainties can be adequately captured empirically is less clear.  Early
papers in the recent wave of empirical growth analysis included measures of political instability,
proxied for instance by the number of coups and revolutions. 3 Such measures certainly have the
advantage of being universally observable and therefore objective but they are also very crude
measures of the relevant uncertainties that affect the private entrepreneurs.  Subjective measures
have been used to proxy for property rights insecurity and corruption by relying on country risk
indicators from expert opinions. 4 These second kind of indicators are likely to reflect more
closely the concerns of entrepreneurs than the overall measures of political instability. However
they are based on the perceptions of country experts and not on those of the local businessmen
themselves.
In this paper we propose an indicator of the "credibility of rules" based on a private sector
survey conducted in 58 countries and covering almost 3,000 enterprises. 5 The survey was
designed to capture local entrepreneurs' views of the predictability of changes in laws and
policies, of the reliability of law enforcement, of the impact of discretionary and corrupt
bureaucracies and of the danger of policy reversals due to changes in governments. We test this
2  See e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Aizenman and Marion (1993).
3  See in particular the influential paper by Barro (1991). Brunetti (1997) provides an updated survey.
4  See Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995)
5  At the time of writing, data from 58 countries was processed and usable for the empirical analysis in this paper.  Data from
about 12 more countries was expected through the World Bank and the surveys conducted by the authors.
2indicator and its various components in standard cross-country growth and investment
regressions and find that low credibility of rules is associated with lower rates of investment and
growth.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 discusses in which respect the existing
measures of political uncertainty might be incomplete and why we designed a different
measurement.  Section 2 presents the survey approach, explains the construction of the overall
indicator of credibility and the various subindicators and discusses possible problems with
selection bias and measurement error.  Section 3 discusses the empirical approach and the
additional economic and political variables used in the regression analysis.  Section 4 presents
the results of growth and investment regressions for the credibility indicator and its components
for the 41 countries where we have reliable data as well as an analysis of a sub set of small
domestic firms and for an extended data set that includes transition economies.
1.  Why a new approach  for measuring  policy uncertainty?
Figure 1 shows how the existing literature on policies and growth can be grouped and
in which respect our approach can be distinguished from the other attempts to measure the degree
of policy uncertainty.
At the most general level we can distinguish two channels through which policies may
influence economic growth: the first focuses on the efficiency of policies and the second on the
reliability of policies.
The.first branch of the literature explains differences in growth with differences in
macro-and mnicroeconomic  policies.  In a large number of studies fiscal policy variables (e.g.
Easterly and Rebelo 1993), monetary policy variables (e.g. Fischer 1993), or trade policy
3variables (e.g. Edwards 1992) have been found to be related to differences in cross-country
growth performance.6
Figure 1: A classification  of the literature  on policies  and growth
Policies and Growth




"Objective" measures  "Subjective" measures
of instability  of uncertainty
(e.g. Barro 1991,
Alesina et al. 1996
Aizenman/Marion 1993 or
HausmannlGavin 1996)
Country experts  Local entrepreneurs
(Mauro 1995,
Knack/Keefer 1995)
The second branch of the literature emphasizes the reliability of policies, i.e. their
stability and uncertainties surrounding their implementation.  Within this branch most studies use
"objective" measures of political instability to proxy for uncertainties.  The variables most often
used are average numbers of violent political events 7 (e.g. riots or political assassinations), the
number of or the estimated probability of government change 8 (e.g. orderly government changes
6  For a survey  see Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1995)  and for a comparative  analysis  Levine  and Renelt  (1992).
7  E.g. Alesina,  Oezler,  Roubini  and Swagel  (1996)  or Barro  (1991).
8  E.g. Londregan  and Poole (1990)  or Cukierman,  Edwards  and  Tabellini  (1992)
4or revolutions and coups) and/or the volatility of macroeconomics variables 9 (e.g. standard
deviations of inflation or tax incomes).
Clearly these "objective" variables are incomplete proxies for the variety of institutional
uncertainties that entrepreneurs are confronted with in their daily business operations.  For
instance they disregard more micro-aspects which entrepreneurs consider important such as
uncertainties in tax legislation, large and unpredictable changes in labor regulations, uncertain
and arbitrary decisions of courts or unclear proceedings in the allocation of all sorts of licenses
etc.'0 Two examples can help making the point. Take for instance Thailand".  Indicators of
political instability which are based on counting the number of coups would characterize
Thailand as a country with high political uncertainty.  But the interviews we conducted with
businessmen suggest that the coups did not affect the credibility of the institutional framework
and that entrepreneurs did not fear wide-ranging policy swings or reversals. The opposite case is
Peru in the 1980s.1 2 Despite the apparent stability of the government, legislation through
executive and emergency decrees was so extensive that the private sector faced a much more
uncertain environment than measures of the number of government changes could capture.
These examples highlight the two problems of all objective indicators of political instability as
proxies for policy reliability: The first problem is that they concentrate on events that the private
sector may not perceive as important and the second is that they fail to capture many
uncertainties that the private sector perceives as crucial.
In essence the  problem of "objective" variables is that they measure instability and not
uncertainty.  Instability can be objectively observed whereas uncertainty is subjective to the
9  E.g. Aizenman and Marion (1993) Easterly and Rebelo (1993) or, more recently, Hausmann and Gavin (1996).
10  See Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1995) for reports on interviews conducted with private businessmen in 10 LDCs.
1J  See Brunetti and Weder (1995a).
12  See Keefer (1990).
5individual investor.  Because investment decisions are based on the subjective evaluations of
businessmen, a variable that captures these perceptions would seem more promising when trying
to explain investment and growth.
The subjective measures of political uncertainty that have been used in the literature 13 are
based on opinions of external experts. Companies that specialize in assessing country risks
commercially provide such indicators. The drawback of these indicators is that they are aimed at
foreign firms and the problems for foreign investors and local entrepreneurs may differ quite
substantially.  For instance, to a large degree these indicators reflect risks of nationalization and
impediments to repatriation of revenues that do not arise in similar intensity for domestic
entrepreneurs.  Also, the degree to which the investors are kept abreast of regulatory changes may
differ significantly for multinational and domestic firms.  Finally, multinationals may receive a
very different treatment from politicians and bureaucrats than the large majority of small local
firms.  Given that in most countries, the development of the private sector mainly depends on
local investors, an indicator based on their perceptions would seem a promising way for a more
encompassing measurement of political uncertainty and its effects on investment and growth. 14
In this paper we aim at filling this gap by constructing a measure of the credibility of rules
based on a private sector survey among domestic entrepreneurs.
13  See Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995).
14  The importance of local investors is underlined by the findings of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and the literature it
triggered, which shows that a large portion of countries' investment generally comes from domestic savings.
62.  Measuring  credibility
2.1  Methodology of the private sector survey
A large scale private sector survey was conducted and responses from almost 3,000 firms
in 58 countries were collected.  Drawing from previous work 15,  we designed a questionnaire
which was aimed at examining the major sources of uncertainty. The questions were not
designed to highlight institutional differences among countries but asked generally if
entrepreneurs were threatened by uncertainty in their relations with the state.  The questionnaire
contained questions on: (i) the predictability of laws and policies, (ii) the subjective evaluation of
political instability  (iii) the security of property and persons (iv) the reliability of judiciary
enforcement, and  (v) uncertainty stemming from corruption and bureaucratic discretion.16
All questions had six standardized responses.  For instance in question number 1
entrepreneurs were asked whether they had to cope regularly with unexpected changes in rules
and regulations which could seriously affect their business. The six answers ranged from
"completely predictable" to "completely unpredictable".  Based on these standardized answers
indices could be constructed for every question. 17
The questionnaires were distributed through World Bank missions and/or local consulting
companies.  The instructions were to observe a stratification of the sample by size, of the
geographic location and of the proportion of purely local companies, i.e. companies which do not
have any foreign participation. The questionnaire was designed for direct mailing, but as a result
t5  See Bomner,  Brunetti and Weder (1995) for a description of a similar but much smaller exercise and Brunetti and Weder
(1995b) for an econometric analysis of the results from that earlier project.
16  The questionnaire also included questions on the efficiency of government in providing services, on specific obstacles for
private entrepreneurs and on the overall government-business interface.  These questions were partly based on the
experience with private sector assessments which have previously been conducted by the World Bank and they were used
for different parts of the World Development Report 1997.
17  Entrepreneurs were also asked how the situation was I0 years ago. The average of the response for 10 years earlier and the
value of 1996 was used to construct a 10 year average (for the transition economies only 5 year averages were considered).
For the indicators of ,,security of property", ,judiciary enforcement" and ,,perceived political instability" we asked directly
in the questionnaire how the rating was 10 years ago. For the indicators of ,,predictability" and ,,corruption" we asked one
overall question for several questions at the end of the block.
7of low quality of the mail system in some countries mail delivery was supplemented or
substituted by hand delivery.  The overall response rate of the survey was more than 30 percent
The intention was to conduct the survey in as many countries as administratively possible.
However, countries' governments were asked if they agreed to participate. At the completion of
this paper usable data is available from 58 countries including 20 African, 9 Latin-American, 9
Eastern European countries, 9 States of the Former Soviet Union, 1 Asian country and 10 OECD
country.18 See Appendix 3 for the list of countries used in the different data sets. For reasons of
confidentiality of the World Bank, individual countries' responses cannot be identified at this
point but more detailed statistics on a regional level can be found in the companion paper
Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997). Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the survey
Table 1. Private  sector survey:  Descriptive  statistics
Total  Min.  Max.  Median  Mean  Standard
deviation
Returned questionnaires 1)
LDC  2,554  17  124  50  57  26
OECD  195  14  26  19  19  4
Company description 2)
Company size
small (less than 50 employees)  0  83  35  40  23
medium (between 50 and 200 employees)  12  72  29  31  13
large (more than 200 employees)  0  71  25  28  19
Companies outside of capital city  1  100  52  51  25
Purely local companies  24  90  67  65  15
1) Number of returned questionnaires
2) Percentage of the total number of questionnaires returned per country
In the empirical analysis we will split up this sample. A core sample of 41 countries
encompasses all countries where we have reliable data for all economic variables used and for a
ten year period. This core sample will be used in most of the econometric analysis. In subsection
4.5. we will provide tests for an extended sample of 53 countries, including some of the
transition economies surveyed as well as separate tests for the transition countries alone. The
8  9 of the OECD  countries  were  provided  by a separate  survey  organized  by the authors  at the University  of Basel
8regression results in this subsection have to be treated more carefully because of inferior data
quality in the economic variables.
2.2.  Construction of the credibility indicator
The credibility-indicator was designed as a broad measure of the reliability of the
institutional framework as perceived by private entrepreneurs. It encompasses several different
sources of uncertainty in the interaction of government and private sector and summarizes them
into one global indicator. The credibility-indicator is composed of five subindicators.  It is
constructed as the simple mean of the average answers that make up these five subindicators. 19
(1)  Predictability of rule making: Extent to which entrepreneurs have to cope with
unexpected changes in rules and policies and whether they expect their governments to
stick to announced major policies.  The degree to which entrepreneurs are usually
informed about important changes in rules and if they can voice concerns when planned
changes affect their business. (average of questions 1-4)
(2)  Subjective perception of political instability: Reflects whether government changes
(constitutional and unconstitutional) are perceived to be accompanied by far-reaching
policy surprises which could have serious effects on the private sector. (average of
questions 5-6)
(3)  Security of persons and property: Reflects whether entrepreneurs feel confident that the
authorities would protect them and their property from criminal actions and whether theft
and crime represent serious problems for business operations. (average of questions 7-8)
(4)  Predictability of judicial enforcement: Captures the uncertainty arising from arbitrary
enforcement of rules by the judiciary and whether such unpredictability presents a
problem for doing business. (question 9)
(5)  Corruption: Asks whether it is common for private entrepreneurs to have to pay some
irregular additional payments to government agents to get things done. (question 10)
19  The individual questions that we asked for the construction of these indicators can be found in tappendix 1.
92.3.  Possible problems with selection bias and measurement error
Below we discuss possible selection biases and measurement errors of our approach.  In
most cases we believe that they should not seriously affect the quality of the results.
A first possible source of selection bias is that governments had to be asked if they agreed
that firms in their country participate in the survey. This introduces the problem that the
countries with low credibility and low growth could choose not to participate in the survey
because their government might fear to have this fact exposed.  This bias would exclude the
worst cases of low credibility.  Not all countries were asked in the first place because the most
important constraint in determining which countries were covered was the internal administrative
capacity of the World Bank to organize the survey in a short time.  Of the countries that were
asked only 5 explicitly chose not to participate and in 5 more there was no official response or
the resident mission preferred not to conduct the survey.
Selection of surveyed enterprises by World Bank missions and local consulting
companies might be a second source of bias.  It is conceivable that in some cases the list of
companies that the World Bank mission had available was not representative for the entire
population of private firms.  However it is not evident that these companies would have a
systematically different perception of the uncertainty of government policies and in which
direction this possible difference would go. Furthermore, in the instructions we asked that the
sample should cover a percentage of companies outside the capital city and additional
stratification was attained with respect to firm size and foreign participation. These requirements
have contributed to balance the sample.
The fact that the questionnaire involved some delicate questions on the relationship to the
government might be another source of selection bias.  There could be two possible problems.
Entrepreneurs which are completely exasperated with their government might take the
opportunity to vent their anger while entrepreneurs who feel reasonably happy might choose not
to answer to the survey.  In this case the bias would be to consistently underestimate credibility.
10The other possibility is that entrepreneurs who are desperate have given up and do not even care
to submit a questionnaire. This would lead to an overestimation of credibility.  Similarly,  some
entrepreneurs might fear that governments find out about their responses and therefore present a
too rosy picture.  In order to temper this fear we conducted the survey anonymously and asked for
no company-specific data which would allow to identify the responder.  All in all, the direction
of a possible company-level bias is not evident: it could lead to under- as well as overestimation
of our variable of interest.
A more serious source of measurement error could be that purely local entrepreneurs
might not have the experience to put their answers in relation to the situation in other countries.
About 60 percent of the total sample of enterprises were purely local, i.e. they had no foreign
participation and did not export. Of course entrepreneurs might still have had good knowledge
of other countries (through imports, or they might even be nationals of other countries)  but
probably in the smaller enterprises there might be businessmen who were ,,purely local".  On the
one hand this is exactly what we want, because when a local entrepreneur feels severely
threatened by uncertainty this would affect his investment behavior in the country.  On the other
hand,  this possible measurement error poses problems in interpreting the relative positions of
countries and may lead to problems in the cross country analysis.
Another problem for correct measurement might arise from the fact that the survey was
conducted in 1996 and the decade averages for the indicators were built by asking about the
situation 10 years ago.  One possible source of bias would be that people do not exactly
remember the past and tend to think that ,,everything was better in the past".  It seems that this
bias is not overwhelming because entrepreneurs did differentiate between their evaluations of the
past in the different questions, i.e. in some cases they clearly stated that the situation had
improved while in others they thought it had worsened.
An additional possible measurement problem might be that the indicator might be
measuring nothing else but the private investment rate.  It is conceivable that entrepreneurs
would respond to questions about the business environment with their general "gut feeling"; that
11their responses would not reflect their opinion about the institutional framework but whether they
invested or not.  This problem doesn't seem to be overwhelming as the answers of individual
entrepreneurs differed substantially from question to question. Businessmen seemed to clearly
distinguish between, say, the perceived political stability and the level of corruption.  An
entrepreneur who would just be expressing his "gut feeling" on the country would tend to tick the
same or very similar ratings for all questions; the degree of differentiation in answers for
different questions from the same respondents is, therefore, comforting.
Finally, a serious selection bias is that  our sample does not include the East Asian
miracle economies which had the highest growth rates during the past 10 years.  At the same
time, in our earlier study (Brunetti and Weder 1995b), these countries proved to have remarkably
credible institutions.  Therefore the sample tends to be biased against finding significant effects
of credibility on growth.
3.  Specification and data sources
In  the  empirical  analysis  we  use  cross-section  regression  analysis  to  evaluate  the
hypothesis  that  high  credibility  is  associated  with  higher  growth  rates  and  higher rates  of
investment.  Starting with the contributions by Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and in particular
Barro  (1991) this has become the standard method for analyzing the sources of cross-country
differences in economic performance.
Our indicator and subindicators of credibility will be added as an additional explanatory
variable  in  the  most  common  specification  of  such  growth regressions.  This  specification
regresses the average rate of growth on the starting level of per capita GDP and human capital.
The first variable controls for the convergence effect predicted by neoclassical growth theory; the
higher initial GDP per  capita the lower will be  the ceteris paribus  growth rate  as decreasing
returns to capital reduce the growth effects of additional capital.  According to this argument, a
country with low starting level of GDP should grow faster and gradually converge to the levels of
higher developed countries.  The problem with this approach is that it does not work for country
12samples that include LDC's  and DCs. 20 Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) have argued that the
neoclassical growth model does not predict absolute but conditional convergence.  Each country
does converge, but not  to a common steady state but to its own steady state that depends  on
country characteristics, most prominently the level of human capital.  As a consequence, more
recent cross-country growth regression analysis has included, as we also do, at least a measure of
human capital as an additional right-hand variable in the basic specification.
In addition to testing the credibility measures in this basic specification we will check
whether the results are sensitive to adding individual additional explanatory variables that are
frequently used in the empirical growth analysis.  The specification we test, therefore, has the
following form:
Growth8493 = ao +  a, LnGDP85  + a2 LnSchooling85 + a3Credibility + a4 X  +  u
,,Growth8493" is the average per capita growth rate for the period 1984 to 1993
calculated from the updated data set provided by Summers and Heston (1991). ,,LnGDP85" is the
natural logarithm of per capita GDP in 1985 Summers and Heston as well. ,Lnschool85"  is the
natural logarithm of the mean years of schooling in 1985. This variable is provided by Barro
and Lee (1994).  Credibility is the average indicator calculated from our survey approach for the
last decade. 2 '  X is an additional variable that is drawn from a sample of standard explanatory
economic and political variables for economic growth. 22
As additional economic variables we will include the following three frequently used
measures: The average rate of inflation (,,Inflation") and the average rate of government
consumption per GDP (,,Govern. Consump.") for 1984-1993 provided by Summers and Heston
and the average degree of openness to international trade measured as the sum of exports and
imports as a percentage of GDP (,,Trade") calculated from World Bank sources.
20  See e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
21  For Poland and Hungary the average was calculated only for the last 5 years.
22  Precise definition of data and data sources can be found in the appendix.
13As additional political variables we individually include five measures.  The average
degree of democracy from 1984-1993 measured by the indicator of political rights compiled by
Freedom House (,,Political Rights").  From Easterly and Levine (1996) we use the 1980-1989
averages of the number of assassinations per million of population (,,Assassinations"), the
number of unorderly transfers of government (,,Coups") and a dummy for whether a country
experienced a war in this period (,,Wars").  Finally we use a composite indicator of the average
quality of bureaucracy for 1984-1993 (,,Bureaucracy") that was calculated by the World Bank
from the data provided by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995). This indicator is an
average composite of a BERI-measure of the speed and efficiency of the civil service, an ICRG-
measure of the general efficiency of government bureaucracy and a BI-measure of bureaucracy
and red tape.
All in all we estimate 9 specifications of growth regressions in order to check the
reliability of the association between credibility and growth. 23
In addition we will check how credibility affects economic growth. Credibility can
influence growth by either affecting the accumulation of capital or by affecting the allocation of
capital to different sectors. We can try to disentangle these effects by separately estimating
investment regression in order to check the effect on accumulation and growth regressions that
control for investment in order to check the effect on allocation. 24 In the empirical section we
will only display investment regressions; results on growth regression controlling for investment
are only mentioned but not shown, they are available on request.
4.  Results
Using specifications and data discussed in the previous part, this section presents the
results of the cross-country regression analysis. We proceed in four steps. In subsection 1 we
present the basic results of the overall credibility indicator in growth- and investment-regressions
23  Appendix 4 provides correlation matrixes for the credibility indicator and the various economic and political variables used
in the empirical analysis.
24  See King and Levine (1993) or Fischer (1993).
14for 41 countries for which we have reliable and reasonably complete data.  Subsection 2
discusses some problems of specification and tests whether they are related to the sample or the
period covered.  Subsection 3 tests each of the five subindicators that together make up the
credibility indicator. In subsection 4 we will test whether the result holds in a sample that
includes only relatively small firms with no foreign participation. Finally, subsection 5 adds a
number of transition economies to our sample and estimates this larger sample of 53 countries as
well as a small sample of 18 countries that only includes transition economies; for this extension
we are forced to work with less reliable and consistent data.
4.1  Basic growth and investment results
We first test the relation between the aggregate indicator of credibility and average per
capita growth rates for the period 1983-1994. The higher the value of this indicator the more
credible the institutional framework is perceived to be so that we expect a positive relationship.
The simple scatterplot is shown below (Figure 2):




-0.06  -0.04  -0.02  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08
GDP  growth,  1984-93
15Table  2 shows  multivariate  regression  results. 25 The first regression  shows  that  the sign
of the coefficient  is positive  in the basic specification  that contains  GDP per capita and average
Table  2: OLS Growth  Regressions  for Credibility  Indicator
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate of GDP per Capita, 1983-1994
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Constant  -0,063*  -0.059  -0,076*  -0,067*  0,038  -0.057  -0,067*  -0.059  -0,082*
(-2,10)  (-1,42)  (-2,41)  (-2,12)  (0,71)  (-1,87)  (-2,09)  (-1,77)  (-2,25)
Ln GDP per Capita  0.002  0,002  0,003  0,002  -0.006  0.0003  0,002  0,002  0,005
(0,37)  (0,28)  (0,46)  (0,43)  (-0,96)  (0,06)  (0,39)  (0,26)  (0,80)
Ln School  0,003  0,003  0,004  0,003  0.0001  0.007  0,003  0,004  0,002
(0,48)  (0,46)  (0,55)  (0,45)  (0,02)  (0,94)  (0,42)  (0,53)  (0,23)
















Credibility  0,014*  0,014*  0,013  0,014  0,011  0,016*  0,015*  0,014*  0,016*
(2,12)  (2,10)  (1,87)  (1,90)  (1,73)  (2,22)  (2,10)  (2,09)  (2,19)
Adjusted R2 0,26  0,24  0,27  0,24  0,33  0,29  0,21  0,21  0,23
Observations  41  41  41  41  41  39  40  40  38
1) T-statistics in Parenthesis
*  significant on the 5 percent confidence level
**  significant on the 1 percent confidence level
25  We also tested a more narrow credibility indicator based only on the questions which directly ask entrepreneurs
about problems for their business operations (questions 1,  4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 in appendix 1). The results for
growth and investment regressions were strengthened when working with this narrower indicator.  We thank
Bill Easterly for pointing out that such a narrower indicator would tend to suffer from endogeneity and general
measurement problems.
16years of schooling as additional right-hand variables. The coefficient is significant at the 5
percent confidence level.  Regressions 2 to 9 test whether this result is sensitive to the inclusion
of additional economic and political right-hand variables.  In general the result proves to be
reasonably robust to the addition of further right hand variables.  In the case of the rate of
government consumption, the number of assassinations, the number of coups, the number of
wars and the quality of bureaucracy, the indicator of credibility has the expected positive sign and
is significant on the 5 percent level.  If we include the rate of inflation, the extent of international
trade or the index of political rights, the coefficient of the indicator is significant only at the 10
percent confidence level.
We proceed to check whether credibility has a positive impact on growth through higher
rates of investment.  Figure 3 shows that investment and credibility are highly correlated.
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17To test this relation more formally, in Table 3 we regress the average rate of total
investment per GDP in the period 1983-1994 on the same set of variables as used in the growth
regression.
Table 3: OLS Investment Regressions for Credibility Indicator
Dependent Variable: Average Investment Rate 1983-1994
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Constant  -0,30**  -0.24*  -0,29**  -0.28**  -0,32*  -0.322**  -0,304**  -0,277**  -0,349**
(-4,66)  (2.71)  (-4.20)  (-4.23)  (-2.67)  (-5,22)  (-4,44)  (-3.92)  (-4.43)
Ln GDP Der Canita  0.037**  0.033*  0.037**  0,036**  0.039**  0,039**  0,037**  0.034**  0,044**
(3,21)  (2.62)  (3,14)  (3.02)  (2.75)  (3.48)  (3,10)  (2.81)  (3.14)
Ln School  -0.003  -0.005  -0.004  -0.002  -0.003  -0.016  -0.005  -0.0004  -0,005
(-0.22)  (-0.33)  (-0.25)  (-0.16)  (-0.17)  (-105)  (-0.35)  (-0,03)  (-0.27)
















Credibility  0,047**  0,047**  0,048**  0,050**  0,048**  0,053**  0,050**  0,047**  0,056**
(3,22)  (3,24)  (3,21)  (3,33)  (3,16)  (3,72)  (3,22)  (3,18)  (3,45)
Adjusted R2 0,71  0,71  0,71  0,68  0,71  0,74  0,66  0,68  0,73
Observations  41  41  41  41  41  39  40  41  38
1) T-statistics in Parenthesis
*  significant on the 5 percent confidence level
**  significant on the 1 percent confidence level
Regression (1) shows that the coefficient of the credibility measure has the expected
positive sign and is highly significant (at the 1 percent level).  Together with the also highly
significant GDP per capita this minimal specification explains 71 percent of the cross-country
variations in investment rates. The result proves to be remarkably robust as can be seen in the
18extended specifications tested in regressions (2) to (9). The coefficient of the credibility
indicator keeps its positive sign and is always significant at the 1 percent confidence level in all
specifications tested. Given these results it can safely be stated that higher credibility is strongly
related to higher rates of investment. This suggests that a credible institutional framework affects
growth mainly by lowering the accumulation of resources.
4.2  Specification issues with standard economic variables in the growth regressions
In this section we discuss some peculiarities of the results obtained in the growth
regression for the other control variables; in Table 2 most  standard economic variables do not
enter with the expected sign and they are mostly not significant. The GDP per capita even has
the ,,wrong" positive sign in most of the regressions. Similar problems arise for the other
additional economic variables i.e. government consumption, inflation and trade that are all
insignificant.  We experimented with a number of additional economic controls and had trouble
finding any significant results.  This differs from the results usually obtained in the growth
literature where samples of about 100 countries and time periods of about three decades are
considered.  One possibility is that the period under consideration is too short to find the standard
long run relationships.  Alternatively our sample of 41 countries could differ systematically from
larger country samples, or some peculiarity in the decade under consideration may lead to
different results than in longer series.  Our test suggest that both kinds of biases are present.
In order to sort out if this is a problem of the decade and/or of our country sample we
tried varying both the country sample and the time period. Table 4 gives an overview of the
results for the two state variables, GDP per capita and schooling, which are the most important in
our context as we include them in every regression.
19Table 4: Test for sample or period peculiarities with state variables
Dependent variable: Growth of GDP per capita
Benchmark')  Our sample  Sample tese)  Period test 3 )
All countries  "our countries"  "our countries"  all countries
3 decades  1 decade  3 decades  I decade
GDP/capita*  significant (-).  insignificant (+)  insignificant ( -)  insignificant ( -)
School*  significant (+)  insignificant (+)  insignificant (+)  insignificant (+)
*  Sign of the coefficient in brackets
1)  The benchmark is based on 117 countries for the period of 1960-1989 (data from King and Levine 1993).
2)  The sample contains the 35 of the 41 countries included in Tables 1 and 2, for which we had data over the
longer period.
3)  The sample contains 68 countries for which we had data for the eighties (data from Mauro 1995).
The benchmark column presents the results of growth regression with the two state
variables for a large sample of countries over 3 decades.  The GDP per capita is negative and
significant and the schooling variable positive and significant. In our sample and period both
variables are positive and insignificant. To test whether a sample problem lies at the heart of this
difference we run a growth regression with our sample of countries using averages for three
decades.  The result is shown in the third column:  again both variables are insignificant
indicating that indeed there is an idiosyncrasy in our country sample. The third column tests if
the decade of the eighties is special in the sense that the benchmark results do not hold for this
shorter period.  Again, our test using a large sample of countries shows that this is the case:  both
variables are insignificant indicating that our period is also in part responsible for the results. 26
The conclusion, therefore, is that the specification problems are in part based on our country
sample and in part on the period of observation.
Because of these specification issues we run growth regressions in which we do not
include the state variables but directly include the other control variables separately.  Table 5
shows the results.  Again, most of the controls were not significant but the significance of the
credibility indicator improved markedly.  It is now significant on the 1 percent level in 7 out of 8
26  The  fact that in different  decades  the standard  results  do not necessarily  hold  was  also observed  by Easterly,  Kremer,
Pritchett  and Summers  (1993)
20regressions.  In the following sections we use the base specification which includes the two state
variables.  We note, though, as the comparison of the results from Table 2 and Table 5 shows,
that this weakens the results for the credibility indicator.
Table 5: OLS Growth Regressions for Credibility Indicator
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate of GDP per Capita
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Constant  -0.047*  -0.067**  0.059**  -0.009  -0.061**  -0.059**  -0.055**  -0.058**
(-2.04)  (-3.72)  (-3.57)  (-0.36)  (-3.80)  (-3.50)  (-3.35)  (-3.31)
















CredibilitV  0.017**  0.018**  0.018**  0.009  0.02**  0.02**  0.018**  0.02**
(3.30)  (3.87)  (3.78)  (1.50)  (4.22)  (3.82)  (3.82)  (2.83)
Adiusted R2 0.26  0.26  0.26  0.35  0.29  0.25  0.26  0.24
Observations  41  41  41  41  39  40  41  38
1) T-statistics in Parenthesis
*  significant on the 5 percent confidence level
**  significant on the 1 percent confidence level
4.3  Subcomponents of the credibility indicator
Tables 6 and 7 present results for the individual subcomponent of the credibility indicator
for the basic growth and investment regressions respectively. These tables show an interesting
picture of the effect of subcomponents on growth and investment.
21Table 6: OLS Base Growth Regressions for Subcomponents of Credibility Indicator
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate of GDP per capita 1983-1994
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -0.072*  -0.056*  -0.058  -0.062*  -0.064*  -0.057
(-2.25)  (-3.48)  (-1.97)  (-2.05)  (-2.03)  (-1.86)
Ln GDP per Capita  0.004  1E-6  0.001  0.005  0.005  0.005
(0.68)  (0.61)  (0.24)  (0.95)  (0.91)  (0.88)
Ln School  0.005  0.008  0.008  0.005  0.004  7E-4
(0.67)  (1.79)  (1.15)  (0.70)  (0.51)  (0.09)
Predictabilitv  0.01
(1.32)
Predictabilitv 112)  0.015**
(2.84)




Lack of Corruption  0.006
(1.05)
Political Instabilitv  0.008
(1.56)
Adiusted R 2 0.20  0.32  0.29  0.23  0.18  0.22
Observations  41  49  41  41  41  41
1)  T-statistics in Parenthesis
2)  Includes 8 additional countries from a previous survey reported in Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1995) of which
the South East Asian  "Tigers" drive the result.
*  significant on the 5 percent confidence level
**  significant on the 1 percent confidence level
The indicator of predictability has the expected sign but is not significant in either the
growth or the investment regression.  We suspect that the sample bias which results from the
omission of the East Asian ,,miracle economies" was particularly important here. These
countries had particularly good predictability results in our previous study;  they were ,,outliers"
on all accounts: growth, investment and predictability. For the indicator of predictability II we
added 8 countries, including some East Asian countries, from our previous survey conducted in
1993 which also covered the four questions that compose the predictability indicator. 27  The
result of both the growth and the investment regressions are dramatically improved when these
additional countries are included; in both cases the indicator is significant at the 1 percent level.
27  These  were the only 8 countries  covered  in the previous  studies  but not (yet)  covered  by the new survey: Brazil, Chile,
Guatemala,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Panama,  Singapore  and Thailand.
22This gives at least an indication that it would be interesting to conduct the survey in these
countries and that predictability might be an important component of overall credibility even
though for our sample of 41 it does not appear significant.
Table 7: OLS Base Investment Regressions for Subcomponents of Credibility Indicator
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate of GDP per capita 1983-1994
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -0.299**  -0.08  -0289**  -0.299**  -0.308**  -0.278**
(-3.97)  (-1.78)  (-4.13)  (-4.64)  (-4.76)  (4.23)
Ln GDP per Capita  0.054**  8E-6  0.045**  0.045**  0.04**  0.044**
(4.09)  (1.46)  (3.61)  (4.20)  (3.47)  (3.91)
Ln School  0.002  0.049  0.007  0.002  -0.006  -0.015
(0.10)  (3.73)  (0.41)  (0.12)  (-0.38)  (-0.95)
Predictability  0.004
(0.17)
Predictabilitv II  2)  0.046**
(3.09)




Lack of Corruption  0.037**
(3.17)
Political Instability  0.031**
(2.96)
Adiusted R2  0.59  0.52  0.62  0.68  0.68  0.67
Observations  41  49  41  41  41  41
1) T-statistics in Parenthesis
2) Includes 8 additional countries from a previous survey reported in Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1995).
*  significant on the 5 percent confidence level
**  significant on the 1 percent confidence level
The security of property rights - which includes also a question about perceived personal
security - is highly significant in the growth regressions. This is particularly interesting since this
sample of 41 does not include the transition economies in which problems of security and
property rights are well publicized. We also experimented with extended growth regressions for
the sample of 41 in which we only include this subindicator and found that it is very robust to
23inclusion of further right-hand variables.  Surprisingly the security of property appears
insignificant in the investment regression.
The inverse pattern appears in the indicator of judiciary  reliability: it is not significant in
the growth regression but highly significant in the investment regression.
The same pattern applies to the corruption indicator: it is significantly associated with
investment but not with growth.  Again, we would have expected that corruption affects not only
the rate of accumulation of resources but also the allocational efficiency of their use.  In
particular because the aggregate investment rate comprises public as well as private investment
and public investment projects are often famously missallocated through bureaucratic corruption.
It is interesting to note, though, that this result is corroborated by Mauro (1995) who with
completely different data and for a larger sample of countries also found that corruption affected
investment but not growth directly.
The indicator of perceived political instability has the same properties as the previous
two: it is significant in the investment regression but not in the growth regression.  This results
contrasts with the findings in the growth literature where some objective political instability
measures such as coups and revolutions are found to affect growth.  It is conceivable, though,
that perceived political instability would affect mostly the investment rate - after all, the kind of
uncertainties that arise from large political events may be more difficult to hedge than for
instance property rights insecurity (which were found to be significantly associated with growth).
In order to hedge the latter it may be enough to employ a private security officer, to hedge the
former the only way might be to move resources out of the country.
Overall the analysis of the individual subcomponents of credibility has given an
interesting and differentiated picture.  The analysis also substantiates our case for using a general
indicator of credibility which encompasses all major sources of uncertainty rather than looking
for the one perfect subindicator:  Some uncertainties may act more through the accumulation and
24others more through the allocation channel.  Given that in the growth analysis we are interested
in both, the summary indicator of credibility seems appropriate.
4.4.  Subsample of small and medium enterprises with no foreign participation
In this section we discuss results for a subsample of enterprises namely the ones which
are small or medium in size and are local, i.e. have no foreign participation (SMLEs). They are a
particularly interesting set of companies because in most countries a large percentage of
investment comes from local rather than foreign sources. This makes the perception of
companies without foreign participation particularly interesting.  Also, the small and medium
sized companies are likely to be the ,,outsiders" in the political process.  Large as well as foreign
entrepreneurs can often be expected to have more clout in the political process and to have
insider knowledge and treatment.  Their perception may therefore not be representative for the
large majority of small business people. The scatterplot of  growth and credibility for this sample
is show below in Figure 4.
Figure 4:  Scatterplot of Credibility Calculated for the Sub-sample of  Small- and Medium-
sized Local Enterprises and GDP per capita growth
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25Growth regression results for this sample are shown in Table 8 which is organized in the
same way as Table 2.  Comparing these two tables shows that the results for the full sample are
strengthened by restricting our sample to the small to medium sized and local enterprises.  In
particular the credibility indicator retains significance in all equations, the coefficient is larger
than for the full sample and the equations explain an average of 2 percent more of the variance in
growth.
Table 8: OLS Growth Regressions for Subsample of Small and Medium Local firms
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate of GDP per Capita, 1983-1994
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Constant  -0.06*  -0.056  -0.07*  -0.064*  0.038  -0.055  -0.06  -0.059  -0.077*
(-2.04)  (-1.38)  (-2.31)  (-2.08)  (0.74)  (-1.86)  (-2.07)  (-1.81)  (-2.18)
Ln GDP per Capita  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002  -0.01  3E-5  0.002  0.001  0.004
(0.25)  (0.18)  (0.35)  (0.31)  (-1.08)  (0.006)  (0.28)  (0.21)  (0.67)
Ln School  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.001  0.008  0.004  0.005  0.004
(0.68)  (0.66)  (0.73)  (0.63)  (0.18)  (1.08)  (0.62)  (0.68)  (0.50)
















Credibility  0.015*  0.015*  0.013*  0.014*  0.012*  0.016*  0.016*  0.015*  0.016*
(2.47)  (2.44)  (2.19)  (2.29)  (2.13)  (2.56)  (2.48)  (2.41)  (2.53)
Adjusted R2 0.28  0.26  0.29  0.27  0.36  0.32  0.26  0.26  0.26
Observations  41  41  41  41  41  39  40  41  38
1) T-statistics in Parenthesis
*  significant on the 5 percent confidence level
**  significant on the 1 percent confidence level
26The scatterplot of credibility of small and medium local enterprises and investment is
shown below (Figure 5).
The investment analysis in Table 9 shows the opposite result to the growth regressions:
The coefficient of credibility is smaller in Table 9 than in Table 3 and the equations explain
about 5 percent less of the variation in investment rates across countries. This suggests that
investment of small and medium local firms is less sensitive to lack of credibility than
investment of large and/or foreign investors. A plausible conjecture is that the group of small
and medium entrepreneurs has few alternatives to investing in their own country.  Large and
foreign firms may base their investment decisions on comparisons of conditions across countries
whereas small and medium firms may have less knowledge and possibilities to invest abroad.
Figure 5:  Scatterplot of Credibility Calculated for the Sub-sample of Small- and Medium-
sized Local Eneterprises and Investment
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We also estimated growth regressions including investment as a right-hand variable to
check whether small and medium local firms are more susceptible to the credibility of their
business environment as far as the efficiency of the allocation is concerned (not shown).  Their
responses explain a larger share of the growth variation than in the full sample of companies and
27the coefficient of credibility is larger and significant in most equations whereas for the overall
sample these coefficients do not reach significance at the 5 percent level.
Table 9: OLS Investment Regressions for Subsample of Small and Medium Local firms
Dependent Variable: Average Investment Rate 1983-1994
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Constant  -0.29**  -0.23*  -0.28**  -0.28**  -0.30**  -0.318**  -0.29**  -0.274**  -0.32**
(-4.37)  (-2.54)  (-3.91)  (-4.01)  (-2.43)  (-4.94)  (-4.17)  (-3.74)  (-3.92)
Ln GDP ver Capita  0.04**  0.036**  0.04**  0.039**  0.041**  0.043**  0.04**  0.038**  0.045**
(3.34)  (2.76)  (3.25)  (0.31)  (2.77)  (3.73)  (3.23)  (3.04)  (2.99)
Ln School  0.001  -0  8E-4  0.002  0.001  -0.012  -0  0.003  0.001
(0.68)  (-0.03)  (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (-0.79)  (-0.02)  (0.20)  (0.82)
















Credibilitv  0.037**  0.037**  0.038**  0.038**  0.037*  0.041**  0.039**  0.036*  0.041**
(2.72)  (2.72)  (2.72)  (2.75)  (2.65)  (3.14)  (2.70)  (2.61)  (2.76)
Adiusted R2 0.66  0.66  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.69  0.64  0.65  0.67
Observations  41  41  41  41  41  39  40  41  38
1) T-statistics in Parenthesis
*  significant on the 5 percent confidence level
**  significant on the 1 percent confidence level
These findings are consistent with the view that small and medium local enterprises are
outsiders to the political process and may have to protect their assets by allocating them to
projects that are less susceptible to institutional uncertainty. Therefore the small and medium
local firms,  although they are less likely to lower their investment, are more likely to put their
resources to less efficient use in the face of low credibility.  Large and/or foreign firms, on the
other hand, can hedge their bets by investing in other countries or by influencing the political
28process. The efficiency of their investment in the country is more dependent on the level of
credibility than the one of small firms but their overall investment is less so as they can invest
abroad.
4.5.  Growth  resultsfor an extended  sample  andfor transition  economies
In this last section we present some results for a larger sample including all transition
economies for which data could be gathered.  These results should be regarded as tentative
because of data limitations when including transition economies.  The results are not directly
comparable with the previous sections because we had to rely on other data sources  for the
economic variables than for the sample or 41.  The larger data set is all from World Bank sources
(see Appendix 2).  Given that 10 year averages are not very sensible in the case of transition
economies we look at the average growth rate for 1990-1995. We use the 10 year average of
credibility for the non transition economies and a 5 year average for the transition economies.
The scatterplot between credibility and growth for this extended set is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Scatterplot of Credibility and GDP per capita Growth for extended set
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29Table 10 shows results for two specifications for the extended sample.  In the base
regression (1) credibility is significant and of the correct sign. In this sample the schooling
variable is significant with a negative sign, presumably because the transition economies create a
strong outlier with high measured schooling and negative growth. However it looses significance
when inflation is introduced as additional control (regression (2)). Inflation is highly significant
for this period and sample, again showing the influence of the transition economies.  Credibility
retains significance in this specification indicating it may be important in explaining differences
in growth performance even in this larger sample of countries.
Table 10: OLS Growth Regressions for extended sample and for Transition Economies
Dependent Variable  Growth GDP  Growth GDP  Growth GDP  Growth GDP  Growth GDP  Growth GDP
ver capita  per cavita  per capita  per cavita  per capita  per cavita
for full set  for full set  for transition  for transition  for transition  for transition
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -2.43  9.41  -43.37  -6.72  142.5  -6.72
(0.32)  (1.58)  (-3.24)  (-0.14)  (1.33)  (-0.14)
Ln GDP per Capita  -0.80  -1.74  -5.56
(-0.40)  (-1.15)  (-0.87)
Ln School 90  -4.16**  -0.94  -37.85
(-2.07)  (-0.58)  (-1.65)
Inflation  -0.02**  -0.013*
(-5.97)  (-2.53)
Credibilitv  5.93**  2.96*  11.40*  15.09*  6.03  1.98
(3.46)  (2.05)  (2.51)  (2.87)  (1.33)  (0.42)
Adjusted  R
2 0.35  0.63  0.24  0.31  0.24  0.39
Observations  50  49  18  16  16  16
1) T-statistics in Parenthesis
*  significant on the 5 percent confidence level
**  significant on the 1 percent confidence level
Clearly the results for this sample have to be interpreted with caution mainly because of
data limitations, short observed time period,  as well as intrinsic problems of measuring and
explaining growth in countries that went trough such a major structural brake.
30To see if credibility can contribute to explaining differences in performance within the
transition economies we tested some regressions for this subsample of 18 countries.  With this
small sample we chose to include a maximum of two right hand variables at the time.  The
scatterplot for credibility and growth in the transitions economies is below (Figure 7).
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Regressions (3-6) in Table 10 show that credibility is significant in the simple regression
and when we control for initial income.  It retains the right sign but looses significance when we
control for schooling and inflation.  It appears that the disruptions created by inflation and the
macropolicies that fueled it overshadowed institutional problems during the transition period.
We experimented with different measures of inflation (consumer price inflation, the GDP
deflator) and this result prevails.  We also experimented with the more recent growth rates of
these economies to exclude some of the early transitionary effect.  We still found a significant
31negative influence of inflation on the average growth rate of 1993-95, but credibility was more
closely associated with growth in this period (p=O.12 not shown).  It may be that institutional
uncertainties become more important as the transition is ending and these countries slowly
approach more "normal times" and private sector development becomes central.  It will be
interesting to see if the private sectors' perception of their institutional framework is a good
predictor of the future investment and growth of these countries.
5.  Conclusions  and directions  for further  research
This paper has presented first results from an ongoing research on the effects of
credibility as perceived by local entrepreneurs on the economic performance of a country.  We
constructed an overall indicator of credibility based on survey data and tested whether it
contributes to explaining differences in growth and investment across countries.  We found that
credibility was significantly associated with cross country differences in growth and investment
in a sample of 41 countries for which comparable data was available.  This result was
strengthened when we looked at a subsample of all small, medium and purely local companies
(i.e. companies that have no foreign participation). We also conducted tentative analysis in a
sample including with transition economies.  The results are promising:  credibility is closely
associated with differences in growth in this sample as well.
For the next rounds of analysis we aim at further expanding our country coverage.  In
particular, we will try to obtain survey results from some NICs, especially some East Asian
tigers.  The credibility ratings of these countries would be particularly interesting as they were the
most successful LDCs in the past decades.
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34Appendix 1: Questions used for the construction of credibility indicator 28
1.  Do you regularly have to cope with unexpected changes in rules, laws or policies which materially
affect your business?
Changes in laws and policies are
(1) completely predictable  ]
(2) highly predictable  []
(3)  fairly predictable  ]1
(4)  fairly unpredictable  o
(5) highly unpredictable  F]
(6)  completely unpredictable  1
2.  Do you expect the government to stick to announced major policies?
(1)  always  [2
(2) mostly  Cl
(3)  frequently  L
(4)  sometimes  [1
(5)  seldom  LI
(6)  never  LI
3.  "The process of developing new rules or policies is usually such that affected businesses are
informed."
This is true
(1)  always  LI
(2)  mostly  LI
(3)  frequently  [1
(4)  sometimes  Fl
(5)  seldom  Fl
(6)  never  11
4.  "In case of important changes in laws or policies affecting my business operation the government
takes into account concerns voiced either by me or by my business association."
This is true
(1)  always  LI
(2) mostly  LI
(3)  frequently  LI
(4)  sometimes  El
(5)  seldom  El
(6) never  [1
28  The indicators were calculated by assigning a 1 for the least favorable and a 6 as the most favorable rating.
355.  "Constitutional  changes  of  government  (as a result of elections) are usually accompanied by large
changes in rules and regulations that have an impact on my business."
To what degree do you agree with this statement?
(1)  fully agree  El
(2)  agree in most cases  O
(3)  tend to agree  O
(4)  tend to disagree  O
(5)  disagree in most cases  O
(6)  strongly disagree  S
does not apply  S
6.  "I constantly fear unconstitutional  government  changes  (i.e. coups) that are accompanied by far-reaching
policy surprises with significant impact on my business."
To what degree do you agree with this statement?
(1)  fully agree  Cl
(2)  agree in most cases  O
(3)  tend to agree  O
(4)  tend to disagree  E
(5)  disagree in most cases  O
(6)  strongly disagree  O
does not apply  O
7.  "Theft and crime are serious problems that can substantially increase the costs of doing business."
To what degree do you agree with this statement?
(1)  fully agree  O
(2)  agree in most cases  O
(3)  tend to agree  S
(4)  tend to disagree  o
(5)  disagree in most cases  S
(6)  strongly disagree  E
8.  "I am not confident that the state authorities protect my person and my property from criminal
actions"
To what degree do you agree with this statement?
(1) fully agree  o
(2)  agree in most cases  Cl
(3) tend to agree  O
(4)  tend to disagree  1
(5) disagree in most cases  S
(6)  strongly disagree  O
369.  "Unpredictability of the judiciary presents a major problem for my business operations."
To what degree do you agree with this statement?
(1)  fully agree  El
(2)  agree in most cases  El
(3)  tend to agree  [
(4)  tend to disagree  C
(5)  disagree in most cases  [
(6)  strongly disagree  ]
10. "It is common for  firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular "additional payments"
to get things done."
This is true
(1)  always  El
(2)  mostly  ]
(3)  frequently
(4)  sometimes
(5)  seldom  Fl
(6)  never  [
37Appendix  2: Description  of variables  and sources
Variable  Description  Period  Source
1. GDP growth
Set of 41  Average annual growth of real GDP per capita in 1985 international prices  1984-93  Summers & Heston
Extended*  Average annual growth rate of real GDP  1990-95  World Bank
2. Gross investment
Set of 41  Real investment over GDP in 1985 international prices  1984-93  Summers & Heston
3. Initial per capita GDP
Set of 41  Log of initial per capita GDP in 1985 international prices  1985  Summers & Heston
Extended*  Log of initial per capita GDP in 1992 international prices  1992  World Bank
4. Initial schooling
Set of 41  Log of average years of schooling  1984-93  Barro & Lee
Extended* Log of gross secondary school enrollment in 1980 for set of 41 and for  1980,  World Bank
1990 for additional countries  1990
5. Government size
Set of 41  Average Government consumption/GDP in 1985 international prices  1984-93  Summers & Heston
6. GDP deflator
Set of 41  Average GDP deflator in 1985 international prices  1984-93  Summers & Heston
Extended*  Average GDP deflator in local currency  1990-95  World Bank
7.  (Export+Import)/GDP
Set of 41  Average ratio of (Export+Import)/GDP in current prices  1984-93  World Bank
8.  Assassination
Set of 41  Average number of political assassinations  1980-89  Easterly & Levine
9.  Coups
Set of 41  Average number of coups  1980-89  Easterly & Levine
10.  War
Set of 41  War dummy  1980-89  Easterly & Levine
11.  Gastil index of political freedom (GIPF)
Set of 41  GIPF ranging from a high of 1 to a low of 7  1984-93  Freedom house
* See Appendix  3 for the list of countries  included  in the extended  set. Data sources  and definition  also applies  to  additional
countries  in transition  set" in the terminology  of appendix  3.
38Appendix  3: Country  list
Set of 41 countries  Additional countries in extended set 29 Additional
countries in
transition set
Austria  Armenia  Albania
Benin  Azerbijan  Estonia
Bolivia  Belarus  Georgia
Cameroon  Bulgaria  Kyrgyz Republic
Colombia  Czech Republic
Congo  Guinea
Costa Rica  Kazakstan
Cote d'Ivoire  Latvia
Ecuador  Lithuania
Fiji  Russia































29  Due  to  lack  of macroeconomic  data  for  the  period  1990-1995,  Fiji  is not  included  in the  extended  set.
39Appendix  4: Correlation  Matrices  for Basic Set of 41 Countries
Table 4.1. Correlation matrix: Credibility indicator, sub-indicators and economic
variables
Credi-  Predic-  Politi-  Prop-  Judi-  Lack of  GDP  Invest  LN  School-  Gov.  GDP  (exp+
bility  tability  cal  erty  ciary  corrup-  growth  GDP  ing  size  deflator  imp)/
instabil-  security  tion  per  GDP
ity  capita
Credibility  1.00
Predictability  0.79  1.00
Political  0.87  0.62  1.00
instability
Property  0.85  0.59  0.66  1.00
security
Judiciary  0.90  0.62  0.65  0.78  1.00
Lack of  0.90  0.73  0.71  0.65  0.79  1.00
corruption
GDP  growth  0.54  0.45  0.50  0.52  0.43  0.44  1.00
Invest  0.76  0.55  0.74  0.56  0.62  0.75  0.45  1.00
LN GDP per  0.71  0.68  0.72  0.53  0.46  0.70  0.47  0.79  1.00
capita
Schooling  0.60  0.53  0.71  0.32  0.35  0.61  0.42  0.62  0.78  1.00
Government  -0.45  -0.45  -0.52  -0.32  -0.25  -0.39  -0.32  -0.57  -0.63  -0.54  1.00
size
GDP deflator  0.12  0.21  -0.08  0.16  0.21  0.10  0.21  0.00  -0.01  -0.03  -0.24  1.00
(exp+imp)/GDP  0.23  0.27  0.17  0.14  0.26  0.20  0.17  0.05  0.06  0.11  0.16  -0.13  1.00
Table  4.2: Correlation  matrix:  Credibility  indicator,  sub-indicators  and policy variables
Credi-  Predic-  Politi-  Prop-  Judi-  Lack of  Assa-  Coup  War  Politi-  Burea-
bility  tabiliy  cal  erty  ciary  corrup-  ssina-  cal  ucracy
instab-  security  tion  tions  rights
ility
Credibility  1.00
Predictabiliy  0.81  1.00
Political  0.85  0.67  1.00
instability
Property  0.83  0.59  0.59  1.00
security
Judiciary  0.88  0.61  0.58  0.74  1.00
Lack  of  0.92  0.74  0.71  0.67  0.81  1.00
corruption
Assassinations  0.16  0.03  0.23  -0.02  0.12  0.23  1.00
Coup  -0.12  -0.26  -0.26  0.06  0.04  -0.12  0.01  1.00
War  -0.21  -0.22  -0.18  -0.32  -0.08  -0.15  0.48  0.08  1.00
Political  rights  -0.67  -0.63  -0.77  -0.48  -0.36  -0.62  -0.17  0.13  0.23  1.00
Bureaucracy  0.69  0.69  0.51  0.52  0.56  0.73  0.05  -0.37  -0.16  -0.60  1.00
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